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Succumbing to bottom-up biases on task choice predicts 
increased switch costs in the voluntary task switching 
paradigm
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Bottom-up biases are widely thought to influence task choice in the voluntary task switching 
paradigm. Definitive support for this hypothesis is lacking, however, because task choice and 
task performance are usually confounded. We therefore revisited this hypothesis using a 
paradigm in which task choice and task performance are temporally separated. As predicted, 
participants tended to choose the task that was primed by bottom-up biases. Moreover, such 
choices were linked to increased switch costs during subsequent task performance. These 
findings provide compelling evidence that bottom-up biases influence voluntary task choice. 
They also suggest that succumbing to such biases reflects a reduction of top-down control 
that persists to influence upcoming task performance.
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or (b) treating each trial as a discrete event in which a task is chosen 
using, essentially, a mental coin flip (Mayr and Bell, 2006). Second, 
a bottom-up availability heuristic is thought to choose the task that 
is currently most active, or available, in working memory, which 
is typically the task performed in the previous trial (Arrington 
and Logan, 2005; Mayr and Bell, 2006; Lien and Ruthruff, 2008). 
Thus, the task-repetition bias is thought to stem from the avail-
ability heuristic.
More direct evidence to suggest an influence of the avail-
ability heuristic on voluntary task choice comes from studies of 
stimulus repetition. The logic is that a stimulus–task association 
is strengthened each time a task is performed on an imperative 
stimulus (Verbruggen and Logan, 2008; Arrington et al., 2010; 
Demanet et al., 2010). Thus, presenting a stimulus that appeared 
in a previous trial should increase the activation of the previous-
trial task representation in working memory, thereby amplifying 
the task-repetition bias. Several findings are consistent with this 
view. First, the task-repetition bias is larger when an imperative 
stimulus matches the stimulus from the previous trial than when 
it does not (Mayr and Bell, 2006). Second, the task-repetition bias 
is larger when an irrelevant stimulus from the previous trial (e.g., 
a random shape) is repeated than when it is not, suggesting that 
stimulus–task associations are formed even for irrelevant stimuli 
(Demanet et al., 2010). Third, participants are biased to perform 
the same task on a repeated imperative stimulus that they initially 
performed, regardless of whether they chose the initial task or the 
experimenter did (Arrington et al., 2010; Demanet et al., 2010). And 
fourth, stimulus repetition amplifies the task-repetition bias more 
when a concurrent working memory load is present than when it is 
absent (Demanet et al., 2010), consistent with prior work indicat-
ing that working memory resources are important for inhibiting 
IntroductIon
Much of human behavior is thought to reflect a mixture of top-down 
and bottom-up processes. For example, driving from Brooklyn to 
Los Angeles involves a combination of top-down processes that 
strategically plan a route and bottom-up processes that enable 
habitual responses to familiar stimuli (e.g., traffic lights) along the 
way. A mixture of such processes is also present in most laboratory 
tasks of selective attention. For instance, performance in the Stroop 
task is thought to be determined by a combination of top-down 
processes that bias attention toward ink color and bottom-up proc-
esses that underlie word reading (MacLeod, 1991). Similarly, the 
locus of spatial attention in the Posner cueing paradigm is thought 
to depend on top-down processes that underlie voluntary orient-
ing of attention and bottom-up processes that orient attention to 
salient events (Posner et al., 1980; Corbetta et al., 2008). Further 
developing our understanding of how top-down and bottom-up 
processes influence performance has therefore become a mainstay 
of modern attention research.
Recently, there has been growing interest in understanding how 
top-down and bottom-up processes influence task choice in the 
voluntary task switching paradigm. In each trial, participants are 
instructed to randomly choose one of two possible tasks to per-
form on an imperative stimulus (Arrington and Logan, 2004). As 
instructed, participants usually perform each task about half the 
time. However, they often exhibit a task-repetition bias, meaning 
that they switch tasks less than 50% of the time. To account for this 
effect, it has been suggested that voluntary task choice is influenced 
by two main processes (Arrington and Logan, 2005; Mayr and Bell, 
2006). First, a top-down random sequence heuristic is thought to 
choose a task by (a) comparing the recent history of task choices to a 
representative random sequence (Arrington and Logan, 2004, 2005) 
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typical confounds, it is unclear whether any potential influence of 
bottom-up biases on voluntary task choice predicts subsequent 
task performance.
In sum, ambiguity regarding whether bottom-up biases influ-
ence voluntary task choice through the availability heuristic has 
arisen because task choice and task performance are usually regis-
tered with a single response. We therefore investigated the influence 
of bottom-up biases on voluntary task choice using a paradigm in 
which voluntary task choice and subsequent task performance are 
registered with different responses (Arrington and Logan, 2005, 
Experiment 6). First, we investigated whether bottom-up biases 
influence voluntary task choice as indexed by a tendency to make 
congruent task choices. Second, we investigated whether congru-
ent voluntary task choices reflect a reduction of top-down control 
that persists to influence subsequent task performance. Specifically, 
we investigated whether switch costs are larger after congruent 
as compared to incongruent voluntary task choices. Our findings 
supported both of these hypotheses.
MaterIals and Methods
PartIcIPants
Fifty-seven healthy, right-handed participants with no history 
of neurological disorders were recruited from the University of 
Michigan community in accordance with the Institutional Review 
Board (mean age: 20.2 years, range: 18–30 years; 33 females). 
Data from three participants were excluded: two participants who 
repeated tasks on more than 80% of the trials, and one participant 
whose accuracy during task performance fell below 85%. Thus, 
only the data from the remaining 54 participants (30 females) were 
further analyzed in group analyses.
aPParatus and stIMulI
The stimuli were generated and displayed using Presentation soft-
ware (Neurobehavioral Systems Inc., Albany, CA, USA). Participants 
viewed the task stimuli on a 17″ CRT monitor at a viewing distance 
of 60 cm. A chin rest was used for head stabilization.
Participants performed a voluntary task switching version of 
the numerical Stroop task, which involved comparing two digits 
in terms of their numerical size or in terms of their physical size 
(Henik and Tzelgov, 1982). In each trial, participants voluntarily 
chose to perform one of these tasks (Figure 1A) or were explicitly 
instructed to perform one of these tasks (Figure 1B). Voluntary 
and explicit task choice trials were presented in a random order 
throughout the experiment.
Each trial began with the presentation of a cue at the center of 
the screen. In voluntary task choice trials, the cue was a question 
mark that prompted participants to voluntarily choose a task. In 
explicit task choice trials, the cue was an “N” or a “P” which, respec-
tively, instructed participants to perform either the numerical or 
the physical size comparison task. In each trial, the cue remained on 
the screen until participants pressed the D key (left middle finger) 
or the F key (left index finger) to indicate which task they would 
perform on the upcoming digit pair. The task-key mapping was 
counterbalanced across participants.
To manipulate which task was most salient to the availability 
heuristic, the central cue in each trial was flanked by two identical 
distracter letters: one appeared 1.37° to the left of the central cue 
bottom-up biases (Lavie, 2004). These findings fit nicely with the 
view that a bottom-up availability heuristic influences voluntary 
task choice.
Additional evidence to suggest that a stimulus can influence 
voluntary task choice in a bottom-up fashion comes from recent 
findings concerning stimulus availability (Arrington, 2008). When 
two stimuli are presented in rapid succession (e.g., a letter and a 
digit), participants are biased to perform the task associated with 
the first stimulus (e.g., the letter). This finding suggests that the 
first stimulus activates its task representation in working memory 
before the second stimulus can activate its task representation, 
thereby increasing the chances that the first task will be chosen via 
the availability heuristic. In sum, studies of stimulus availability 
also suggest that a stimulus can influence voluntary task choice in 
a bottom-up fashion.
Definitive support for this view is lacking, however, because task 
choice and task performance are usually registered with a single 
button press to an imperative stimulus. Putative bottom-up biases 
on task choice may therefore reflect bottom-up biases on task 
performance. First, consider the finding that stimulus repetition 
amplifies the task-repetition bias (Mayr and Bell, 2006). Although 
repeating a stimulus may prime the task with which it was most 
recently associated (Verbruggen and Logan, 2008; Arrington et al., 
2010; Demanet et al., 2010), it may also prime the task-relevant 
response with which it was most recently linked (Hommel, 1998). 
Participants may therefore execute this response without actually 
making a task choice (Arrington et al., 2010; Demanet et al., 2010). 
Second, consider the finding that stimulus availability biases par-
ticipants to perform the task associated with the first of two rapidly 
presented stimuli (Arrington, 2008). This effect may occur because 
the first stimulus (e.g., a letter) activates its task representation in 
working memory more quickly than the second stimulus (e.g., a 
digit; Arrington, 2008). However, the two stimuli are unambiguously 
mapped not only to different tasks, but also to different responses. 
The first stimulus may therefore also prime a task-relevant response 
more quickly than the second stimulus, and participants may sim-
ply execute this response without making a task choice. For these 
reasons, data to support the view that a stimulus can influence vol-
untary task choice in a bottom-up fashion are often ambiguous.
Given this ambiguity, it is also unclear whether any potential 
influence of the availability heuristic on voluntary task choice is 
related to subsequent task performance. If such an influence stems 
from a reduction of top-down control (Arrington and Yates, 2009; 
Demanet et al., 2010) and if this reduction persists for a few seconds 
(e.g., due to fatigue, diminished motivation, etc.), then subsequent 
task performance might also exhibit signs of reduced control. For 
instance, switch costs might be higher when participants select the 
task primed by the availability heuristic (congruent task choice 
trials) as compared to the opposite task (incongruent task choice 
trials). Relatively little data speak to this issue, however, because 
the congruency of a task choice with respect to the availability 
heuristic is usually confounded with repeating versus switching 
tasks. For example, choosing the task that is primed by a stimulus 
repetition (i.e., a congruent task choice) usually involves repeat-
ing the task from the previous trial. Conversely, choosing the task 
that is not primed by a stimulus repetition (i.e., an incongruent 
task choice) typically involves switching to a new task. Given these 
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“Os”). We reasoned that, while serving as a distracter letter, an “N” 
or a “P” would activate (a) a representation of a specific task and/
or (b) a representation of the response involved in choosing that 
task. Either or both of these representations might then influence 
voluntary task choice through the availability heuristic (Arrington 
et al., 2010).
To determine whether voluntary task choice was influenced 
by the distracter letters, we distinguished among three types of 
voluntary task choice trials. In congruent voluntary task choice 
trials, participants chose the task signaled by the distracter letters. 
In incongruent voluntary task choice trials, participants chose the 
task that was not signaled by the distracter letters. In neutral vol-
untary task choice trials, participants chose a task in the presence 
of two distracter letters that were not associated with either of the 
two possible tasks.
Five hundred milliseconds after participants indicated which 
task they would perform in response to the central cue, two dig-
its appeared (1.7° above and 1.7° below fixation). One digit was 
numerically larger (7, 8, or 9) and the other was numerically smaller 
(1, 2, or 3). Further, one digit was physically larger (0.7° by 1.1°) 
while the other was physically smaller (0.4° by 0.6°). In congru-
ent trials (50%), the numerically larger digit was also physically 
larger. In incongruent trials (50%), the numerically larger digit 
was physically smaller. The digits remained on the screen until 
the participant indicated the spatial position (top or bottom) of 
the digit that was larger at the relevant dimension (i.e., numerical 
size or physical size) by pressing the J key (the digit on top; right 
middle finger) or the N key (the digit on the bottom; right index 
finger) on a computer keyboard.
The next trial was presented after a response-to-cue interval 
(RCI) of either 0 ms or 1000 ms. Switch costs are typically larger 
after short as compared to long RCIs, suggesting a passive dissipa-
tion of the task-set from the previous trial (Allport et al., 1994; 
Arrington and Logan, 2005). Recent findings, however, suggest that 
this effect occurs only when the RCI varies from one trial to the 
next and not when the RCI remains constant throughout a block 
of trials (Horoufchin et al., 2010). It has therefore been suggested 
that mechanisms other than a passive decay of the previous trial’s 
task-set, such as the temporal distinctiveness of the current task 
cue, may explain the effect of RCI on switch costs (Horoufchin 
et al., 2010). Nonetheless, at least one prior study has revealed that 
switch costs are larger after short compared to long RCIs when 
the RCI remains constant throughout a block of trials, but varies 
across participants (Koch, 2001). Although this result appears more 
consistent with task-set decay than with temporal distinctiveness, 
it has been suggested that it may somehow have resulted from the 
fact that participants switched among three possible tasks, rather 
than just two (Horoufchin et al., 2010). We therefore investigated 
whether we could replicate this result by varying the RCI across (but 
not within) participants in our paradigm, which involved switching 
between just two tasks. The RCI lasted 0 ms for 28 participants and 
1000 ms for 26 participants.
Procedure
The procedure consisted of four parts. First, participants practiced the 
numerical and physical size comparison tasks separately. Each practice 
block (one for each task) consisted of 20 trials, and the order in which 
and the other appeared 1.37° to the right (Figure 1). The distracter 
letters were often strongly associated with either the numerical or 
the physical size comparison task because they served as explicit 
cues to perform these tasks in explicit task choice trials. Specifically, 
in equal numbers of trials, the distracter letters were associated 
with the numerical size comparison task (i.e., two “Ns”), the physi-
cal size comparison task (i.e., two “Ps”), or with no task (i.e., two 
N?N
Which number 
is larger?
+
7
3
+
Choose Task Perform Task
Unl Response 500 ms Unl Response
+
7
3
+
Confirm Task Perform Task
Unl Response 500 ms Unl Response RCI: 0 or 1000 ms
PNP
“Top Number”
“Boom Number”
“Top Number”
“Boom Number”
Which number 
is larger?
RCI: 0 or 1000 ms
+
+
A
B
Figure 1 | examples of voluntary and explicit task choice trials used in 
the experiment. Participants performed a task switching version of the 
numerical Stroop task, which involved comparing two digits with respect to 
their numerical size or with respect to their physical size. (A) Each voluntary 
task choice trial began with the presentation of a central question mark (“?”), 
which indicated that participants should voluntarily choose which task to 
perform. Participants were instructed to indicate their task choice by pressing 
a button with the middle or index finger of their left hand. (B) Each explicit task 
choice trial began with the presentation of a central cue letter, which indicated 
that participants should choose to perform either the numerical or the physical 
size comparison task. Participants were instructed to confirm their task choice 
by pressing a button with the middle or index finger of their left hand. In both 
voluntary and explicit task choice trials, the central cue was flanked by two 
identical distracter letters that were associated with the numerical size 
comparison task (i.e., two “Ns”), the physical size comparison task (i.e., two 
“Ps”), or neither task (i.e., two “Os”). The cue and flanking distracter letters 
remained on the screen until participants indicated their task choice. Five 
hundred milliseconds after making a task choice, the imperative task stimuli 
(i.e., two digits) appeared. One was numerically larger (e.g., “7”) while the 
other was numerically smaller (e.g., “3”). Further, one was presented in a 
larger font (e.g., “3”) while the other was presented in a smaller font (e.g., 
“7”). In congruent trials, the numerically larger digit was also physically larger. 
In incongruent trials, the numerically larger digit was physically smaller. 
Depending on the task, participants indicated which of the two digits (top or 
bottom) was numerically larger or physically larger. They were instructed to 
indicate their decision as quickly and as accurately as possible by making a key 
press with either their right index finger or their right middle finger. The next 
trial began after a 100 or a 1000 ms response-to-cue interval (RCI), which 
varied across participants.
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we created a task choice index: the proportion of trials in which par-
ticipants voluntarily chose the numerical size comparison task minus 
the proportion of trials in which they voluntarily chose the physical 
size comparison task. We reasoned that if participants were biased 
to make congruent task choices, then the task choice index would be 
positive when the distracter letters were “Ns” and negative when the 
distracter letters were “Ps.” Further, we predicted that the task choice 
index would not differ from 0 when the distracter letters were “Os,” 
which were associated with neither of the two possible tasks.
We evaluated these predictions by submitting the mean task 
choice index in voluntary task choice trials to a mixed ANOVA 
with one between-participants factor, RCI (0, 1000 ms), and three 
within-participants factors: previous agency (voluntary, explicit), 
current task transition (repeat, switch), and current distracter 
identity (“N,” “P,” “O”). Table 1 indicates the proportion of tri-
als in which participants chose each task as a function of current 
distracter identity. As predicted, there was a main effect of current 
distracter identity [F(1.4,75.3) = 45.1, p < 0.001]. The task choice 
index was positive when the distracter letters were “Ns” (14.3%; 
95% CI: 9.8–18.8), negative when the distracter letters were “Ps” 
(−16.0%; 95% CI: −11.0 to −20.9), and did not differ from 0 when 
the distracter letters were “Os” (−2.2%; 95% CI: −5.3 to 1.0). Also 
as expected, post hoc tests revealed that the task choice index was (a) 
more positive when the distracter letters were “Ns” than when they 
were “Os” (p < 0.001) and (b) more negative when the distracters 
were “Ps” than when they were “Os” (p < 0.001). These findings 
support the view that a stimulus can influence voluntary task choice 
in a bottom-up fashion through the availability heuristic.
There was also an interaction between previous agency and cur-
rent distracter identity [F(1.9,100.7) = 12.1, p < 0.001; Figure 2]. 
Post hoc tests indicated that participants were more likely to choose 
the task associated with the distracter letters when the task choice 
in the previous trial was explicit than when it was voluntary (both 
p < 0.001). A potential explanation addressed below is that the associ-
ation between a distracter letter and a task choice was stronger when 
that distracter letter had (versus had not) appeared as an explicit 
cue in the preceding trial. No other effects were significant.
As described above, participants were biased to make con-
gruent task choices in voluntary task choice trials. We therefore 
reasoned that voluntary switch rates should be lower when the 
identity of the current distracter letters matched the previous-trial 
task (thus priming a task repeat) than when it mismatched and 
signaled the opposite task (thus priming a task switch). To test 
this prediction, we conducted a mixed ANOVA on switch rates 
with one between-participants factor, RCI (0, 1000 ms), and two 
within-participants factors: current distracter identity–previous 
the tasks were practiced was counterbalanced across participants. 
Second, participants practiced voluntarily choosing to perform either 
the numerical or the physical size comparison task when prompted 
by a question mark. In particular, they performed a single block of 36 
voluntary task choice trials in the absence of distracter letters. Third, 
to prepare for the actual experiment, participants practiced randomly 
alternating between voluntary and explicit task choice trials. That is, 
they performed a single block of 32 trials in which voluntary and 
explicit task choice trials appeared in a random order. As in the actual 
experiment, each cue was flanked by two identical distracter letters. At 
the end of each voluntary task choice and mixed voluntary–explicit 
task choice practice block above, participants were told the propor-
tion of trials in which they (a) performed each task and (b) switched 
tasks. If either proportion was less than 40% or greater than 60%, they 
performed that particular practice block again. Each type of practice 
block (i.e., voluntary and mixed voluntary–explicit) was practiced an 
average of 1.2 times. Fourth, participants’ performance was measured 
in 15 blocks of the main experiment, each of which contained 72 
trials. The instructions stressed that in voluntary task choice trials a 
task should be chosen randomly. Moreover, participants were told that 
they could take their time choosing which task to perform, but that 
they needed to subsequently perform the task as quickly as possible 
while remaining accurate.
data analysIs
Prior to the main analyses, we discarded (a) outlier trials in which 
reaction time (RT) during task performance was either faster than 
200 ms or slower than three standard deviations from the partici-
pant’s mean RT and (b) trials that were preceded by outlier trials. 
In this manner, 2.9% of trials were discarded. We also discarded 
trials in which an error occurred and trials with a correct response 
that immediately followed errors. In this manner, 11.5% of trials 
were discarded. In total, 13.4% of trials were discarded prior to 
the main analyses.
On the remaining data, omnibus tests were conducted using 
mixed analysis of variance (ANOVA). When necessary, Greenhouse–
Geisser corrections for non-sphericity were applied to adjust the 
degrees of freedom. Post hoc pairwise comparisons were performed 
using the Newman–Keuls test.
results
task choIce ProPortIons
The voluntary task choice data were largely consistent with prior 
studies of voluntary task switching. First, participants performed 
each task about half the time. The mean probabilities for voluntarily 
choosing (a) the numerical size comparison task (49.7%; 95% CI: 
48.3–50.5) and (b) the physical size comparison task (50.3%; 95% 
CI: 49.5–51.7) both had 95% confidence intervals that included 
50%. Second, participants exhibited a task-repetition bias: the mean 
voluntary switch rate (43.2%) had a confidence interval that fell 
below 50% (95% CI: 39.4–47.1). Thus, we replicated two standard 
effects in the voluntary task switching paradigm.
Our first main hypothesis was that participants would exhibit a 
tendency to make congruent task choices. To test this hypothesis, we 
determined how often participants voluntarily chose each task as a 
function of the distracter letter pair (two “Ns,” two “Ps,” or two “Os”) 
that appeared in each trial. Next, for each of these three conditions, 
Table 1 | Task choice proportion as a function of distracter identity.
Distracter Numerical size Physical size 
identity comparison comparison
N 56% (1%) 44% (1%)
P 43% (1%) 57% (1%)
O 49% (1%) 51% (1%)
Each value in parentheses represents the standard error of the mean.
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choices. To investigate this hypothesis, we analyzed mean RT during 
task performance using a mixed ANOVA with RCI (0, 1000 ms) as 
a between-participants factor and four within-participants factors: 
agency (voluntary, explicit), cue congruency (congruent, incongru-
ent, neutral), target congruency (congruent, incongruent), and task 
transition (repeat, switch)1. Table 2 provides the mean RT for each 
cell of this ANOVA. Critically, there was an interaction between cue 
congruency and task transition [F(1.9,100.2) = 5.5, p < 0.01]. In 
line with predictions, planned comparisons revealed that switch 
costs in congruent task choice trials (70 ms) were larger than those 
in both incongruent [47 ms; F(1,52) = 7.9, p < 0.01] and neutral 
[50 ms; F(1,52) = 7.6, p < 0.01] task choice trials.
We were particularly interested in whether these effects were 
present in voluntary task choice trials. We therefore conducted 
planned comparisons to determine the effect of cue congruency 
on switch costs separately in voluntary and explicit task choice 
trials. As predicted, switch costs were larger in congruent (67 ms) 
than in either incongruent [33 ms; F(1,52) = 8.0, p < 0.01] or 
neutral [40 ms; F(1,52) = 6.4, p = 0.01] voluntary task choice tri-
als (Figure 4). In contrast, switch costs in congruent explicit task 
choice trials (74 ms) did not differ from those in either incongru-
ent [61 ms; F(1,52) = 1.6, n.s.] or neutral [60 ms; F(1,52) = 2.2, 
n.s.] explicit task choice trials. Nonetheless, in line with our second 
main hypothesis, our findings in voluntary task choice trials suggest 
that less top-down control was recruited during task performance 
in congruent as compared to either incongruent or neutral task 
choice trials.
Two effects involving agency were also significant. First, there was 
an interaction between agency and task transition [F(1,52) = 6.4, 
p = 0.01]. Replicating prior findings (Arrington and Logan, 
2005), switch costs were larger in explicit [65 ms; F(1,52) = 110.1, 
p < 0.001] than in voluntary [47 ms; F(1,52) = 40.4, p < 0.001] task 
task relationship (match, mismatch, neutral) and previous agency 
(voluntary, explicit). As expected, there was a main effect of current 
distracter identity–previous task relationship [F(1.4,73.3) = 44.3, 
p < 0.001]. Switch rates were lowest when the current distracter 
identity matched the previous task (36.3%), intermediate when 
the current distracter identity was neutral (44.3%), and highest 
when the current distracter identity mismatched the previous task 
and therefore signaled the opposite task (49.7%). Post hoc pair-
wise comparisons revealed that each of these three values differed 
from the other two (all p’s < 0.01). These findings support previ-
ous claims that task availability influences voluntary switch rates 
(Arrington and Logan, 2005; Mayr and Bell, 2006; Arrington et al., 
2010; Demanet et al., 2010).
There was also an interaction between current distracter identity–
previous task relationship and previous agency [F(1.9,98.2) = 14.3, 
p < 0.001; Figure 3]. When the current distracter identity matched 
the previous task, switch rates were lower if the previous trial con-
tained an explicit cue as compared to a voluntary cue (post hoc 
comparison: p < 0.001). Conversely, when the current distracter 
identity mismatched the previous task (i.e., signaled the opposite 
task), switch rates were higher if the previous trial contained an 
explicit cue as compared to a voluntary cue (post hoc comparison: 
p < 0.05). Finally, when the current distracter identity was neutral 
with respect to the previous task (i.e., two “Os”), switch rates did 
not vary with whether the previous trial contained an explicit cue as 
compared to a voluntary cue (post hoc comparison: p > 0.09). These 
findings are consistent with our earlier suggestion that the strength 
of the association between a distracter letter and a task choice was 
greater when the distracter letter had served as an explicit cue in 
the previous trial. No other effects were significant.
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Figure 2 | The task choice index (i.e., the proportion of trials in which 
participants voluntarily chose the numerical size comparison task minus 
the proportion of trials in which they voluntarily chose the physical size 
comparison task) as a function of distracter identity (N, P, or O) and 
previous agency (voluntary, explicit). Positive values indicate a bias to 
choose the numerical size comparison task more often than the physical size 
comparison task. Negative values indicate the opposite bias. Participants 
tended to choose the task associated with the distracter letters (i.e., a positive 
task choice index for N distracters and a negative task choice index for P 
distracters) and this bias was stronger after explicit than after voluntary task 
choice trials. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.
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Figure 3 | Mean switch rate varied with an interaction between current 
distracter identity–previous task relationship and previous agency. When 
the current distracter identity (e.g., N) matched the previous task (e.g., the 
numerical size comparison task), switch rates were higher if the previous trial 
involved a voluntary task choice as compared to an explicit task choice. In 
contrast, when the current distracter identity (e.g., N) mismatched the 
previous task (e.g., the physical size comparison task), switch rates were 
higher if the previous trial involved an explicit task choice as compared to a 
voluntary task choice. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.
1Unlike the task choice data, there were no main effects or interactions involving 
previous agency in the task performance data. Therefore, we did not include pre-
vious agency as a factor in the final analyses of these data.
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(735 ms) trials. Third, and also expected (Arrington and Logan, 
2005), there was an interaction between task transition and RCI 
[F(1,52) = 13.0, p < 0.001]: switch costs were greater after the short 
RCI [77 ms; F(1,52) = 91.4, p < 0.001] than after the long RCI 
[35 ms; F(1,52) = 17.7, p < 0.01]. This result appears more con-
sistent with the task-set decay hypothesis of RCI effects on switch 
costs (Allport et al., 1994; Arrington and Logan, 2005) than with 
the temporal distinctiveness hypothesis (Horoufchin et al., 2010). 
Fourth, there was an interaction between target congruency and 
RCI [F(1,52) = 6.2, p < 0.05]: the effect of target congruency was 
larger after the long RCI [153 ms; F(1,52) = 293.4, p < 0.001] than 
after the short RCI [122 ms; F(1,52) = 201.6, p < 0.001]. No other 
effects were significant2.
task PerforMance – Mean error rate
Mean error rates were relatively low (5.1%). As an analysis of error 
rates was not crucial for testing our hypotheses, we simply note 
two important findings. First, no speed-accuracy tradeoffs were 
observed. Second, mean error rates in voluntary task choice trials 
were low (4.5%) and did not differ among congruent (4.6%), incon-
gruent (4.7%), and neutral (4.3%) task choice trials [F(2,104) = 0.05, 
choice trials. Second, there was interaction between agency and cue 
congruency [F(1,52) = 6.3, p < 0.005]. Recent work indicates that 
presenting an irrelevant task cue during task preparation slows 
responses when it signals a task that should not (versus should) 
be performed in the current trial (Braverman and Meiran, 2010). 
Thus, we performed planned comparisons to determine whether 
this cue congruency effect was significant in both explicit and 
voluntary task choice trials. The effect was significant in explicit 
[12 ms; F(1,52) = 5.5, p < 0.05], but not in voluntary [−8 ms; F(1, 
52) = 1.3, n.s.] task choice trials. Moreover, it was significantly 
larger in explicit than in voluntary task choice trials [F(1,52) = 5.9, 
p < 0.05]. These results indicate that agency modulated both switch 
costs and the effect of cue congruency on task performance.
Several expected effects that were less important for test-
ing our hypothesis were also significant. First, there was a main 
effect of target congruency [F(1,52) = 492.3, p < 0.001]: partici-
pants responded more slowly in incongruent (832 ms) than in 
congruent (694 ms) trials. Second, there was a main effect of 
task transition [F(1,52) = 93.4, p < 0.001] because participants 
responded more slowly in task switch (791 ms) than in task repeat 
Table 2 | Mean reaction time (ms) in the main conditions of the study.
 Congruent task choice incongruent task choice Neutral task choice
Task transition Congruent target incongruent target Congruent target incongruent target Congruent target incongruent target
0 ms rCi
Voluntary trials
 Repeat 695 (22) 814 (24) 703 (23) 845 (25) 707 (24) 824 (26)
 Switch 782 (26) 907 (25) 755 (27) 888 (26) 770 (22) 866 (24)
Explicit trials
 Repeat 672 (24) 798 (26) 679 (22) 824 (25) 687 (26) 798 (25)
 Switch 768 (25) 885 (25) 769 (25) 900 (28) 780 (25) 893 (27)
1000 ms rCi
Voluntary trials
 Repeat 650 (23) 810 (25) 655 (24) 800 (26) 632 (25) 793 (27)
 Switch 696 (27) 850 (26) 679 (28) 813 (27) 669 (23) 813 (25)
Explicit trials
 Repeat 628 (25) 763 (27) 637 (23) 793 (26) 648 (27) 799 (26)
 Switch 660 (26) 842 (26) 671 (26) 835 (29) 670 (26) 830 (28)
Each value in parentheses represents the standard error of the mean.
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Figure 4 | Switch costs (i.e., incongruent rT–congruent rT) were larger 
in congruent task choice trials than in either incongruent or neutral task 
choice trials. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.
2We performed supplementary analyses of the task performance RT data to investi-
gate whether asymmetric switch costs were present in our paradigm, even though 
the presence or absence of such effects was not central to our hypotheses. The-
se analyses involved a mixed ANOVA with four factors: RCI (0, 1000 ms), agency 
(voluntary, explicit), task (numerical size comparison, physical size comparison), 
and task transition (repeat, switch). As expected, there was a main effect of task 
[F(1, 52) = 14.0, p < 0.001] as mean RT was faster for the relatively simple physical 
size comparison task (748 ms) than for the more complex numerical size compa-
rison task (772 ms). Moreover, consistent with previous findings (Yeung, 2010), 
there was a significant interaction between task and task transition [F(1,52) = 6.9, 
p = 0.01] indicating the presence of asymmetric switch costs in our paradigm. As 
expected based on these prior findings, switch costs were larger for the easier phy-
sical size comparison task (61 ms) than for the harder numerical size comparison 
task (43 ms).
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flanker, etc.) often prime the goals and/or responses with which 
they are associated, thereby interfering with task performance 
(e.g., MacLeod, 1991; Kane and Engle, 2003). The congruent task 
choice bias extends these previous results by showing that irrelevant 
distracters also interfere with voluntary task choice. Future stud-
ies might therefore further investigate the nature of this interfer-
ence. For example, motivated by studies in the selective attention 
literature (Dehaene et al., 1998; Lavie, 2004), such studies could 
investigate whether interference during voluntary task choice (a) 
requires conscious perception of the distracter letters, (b) depends 
on whether a concurrent working memory load is present, or (c) 
occurs in ecologically valid settings (e.g., deciding whether to check 
e-mail or send a text message).
Further analyses revealed that the congruent task choice bias was 
larger after explicit than after voluntary task choice trials. Moreover, 
following explicit task choice trials, this bias was greater when the 
distracter letters in the current trial matched the explicit cue in the 
previous trial than when they mismatched. The latter result suggests 
that the strength of the association between a distracter letter and 
a task choice was strongest (and exerted the largest influence on 
voluntary task choice) when the distracter letter had served as an 
explicit cue in the previous trial. Thus, by mixing voluntary and 
explicit task choice trials in the same blocks, we were able to obtain 
additional evidence that bottom-up factors influence task choice 
in the voluntary task switching paradigm.
The congruent task choice bias raises an interesting question 
about the locus of bottom-up influences on voluntary task choice 
in our paradigm. Specifically, do the distracter letters influence 
voluntary task choice by activating (a) the decision to perform a 
particular task, (b) the response used to indicate that task choice, or 
(c) both? The critical distracter letters in voluntary task choice trials 
(i.e., “N” and “P”) served as task cues in explicit task choice trials. 
Thus, they probably activated the decision to perform a specific 
task, regardless of whether they also activated the response used 
to indicate that choice. Consistent with this view, mean error rates 
in congruent, incongruent, and neutral voluntary task choice tri-
als were uniformly low. Moreover, this was the case even when the 
upcoming imperative stimulus was incongruent, such that better-
than-chance performance required activating the correct task goal. 
Thus, it would appear that the distracter letters in voluntary task 
choice trials activated the decision to perform a particular task.
There are two ways in which the critical distracter letters in 
congruent voluntary task choice trials could activate the deci-
sion to perform a particular task, and both are consistent with a 
 bottom-up influence of the distracters on voluntary task choice. 
First, the distracter letters could directly prime the decision, or goal, 
to perform a particular task. Second, the distracter letters could 
prime a particular task-selection response which, in turn, leads to 
the decision to perform a particular task (i.e., via response–decision 
priming or because participants strategically activate the appropri-
ate task goal after noticing that they make a particular task-selection 
response). In both of these scenarios, the distracter letters influence 
voluntary task choice in a bottom-up fashion (Arrington et al., 
2010). However, these scenarios differ with regard to whether this 
influence is direct or indirect. Future studies might therefore be 
conducted to distinguish between these interesting possibilities. For 
example, suppose that the distracter letters influence task choice 
n.s.]. Indeed, even restricting our analyses to voluntary task choice 
trials in which an incongruent target was presented (in these trials, 
activating the correct task representation was absolutely necessary 
for achieving better than 50% performance) revealed no differences 
among congruent (8.3%), incongruent (8.3%), and neutral (7.9%) 
task choice trials [F(2,104) = 0.05, n.s.]. Our finding that error rates 
were as low in congruent as in incongruent and neutral voluntary 
task choice trials suggests that the distracter letters in congruent 
voluntary task choice trials primed a decision about which task to 
perform, regardless of whether they also primed the task-selection 
response associated with choosing that task.
task choIce – Mean rt
Consistent with our second hypothesis, switch costs were larger 
when participants selected the task primed by the availability heu-
ristic (congruent task choice trials) than when they did not (i.e., 
incongruent and neutral task choice trials). This result suggests that 
congruent task choices reflect a reduction of top-down control that 
can persist to adversely influence subsequent task performance. An 
alternative explanation, however, is that congruent task choices 
were made more quickly than either incongruent or neutral task 
choices, thereby shortening the amount of time between successive 
trials. Given that slowly dissipating proactive interference from 
the previous trial contributes to switch costs (Allport et al., 1994), 
such a difference in timing could also have led to elevated switch 
costs in congruent task choice trials, relative to incongruent and 
neutral task choice trials.
To test this alternative account, we analyzed the mean choice RT 
data from voluntary task choice trials using a mixed ANOVA with 
one between-participants factor, RCI (0, 1000 ms), and three within-
participants factors: previous agency (voluntary, explicit), current 
task transition (repeat, switch), and cue congruency (congruent, 
incongruent, neutral). As expected (Arrington and Logan, 2005), 
there was a main effect of current task transition [F(1,52) = 9.2, 
p < 0.005]: participants were slower when they chose to switch 
tasks (877 ms) than when they chose to repeat tasks (747 ms). 
Participants were also slower to voluntarily choose a task after an 
explicit (875 ms) as compared to a voluntary (712 ms) task choice 
trial [F(1, 52) = 5.4, p < 0.05]. However, no other effects were 
significant, including all main effects and interactions involving 
cue congruency. Thus, it is unlikely that the elevated switch costs 
in congruent as compared to incongruent and neutral voluntary 
task choice trials, reflected greater proactive interference from the 
previous trial.
dIscussIon
The present results make two important contributions to the lit-
erature on voluntary task switching. First, they unambiguously 
indicate that bottom-up biases influence voluntary task choice. 
Second, they show that succumbing to such biases predicts reduced 
top-down control (i.e., increased switch costs) during task per-
formance. We now discuss our findings in relation to the existing 
literature along with several new questions that they raise.
Our finding that participants were biased to make congruent 
task choices (i.e., that they exhibited a congruent task choice bias) 
fits nicely with the literature on selective attention. Specifically, 
irrelevant distracters in selective attention tasks (e.g., Stroop, 
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subsequent task performance. However, this interpretation raises 
the question of why congruency effects during task performance 
were not also increased following congruent task choice trials. 
Numerous findings indicate that top-down control is required to 
limit interference from irrelevant stimuli (Lavie, 2004; Egner and 
Hirsch, 2005; Gazzaley et al., 2005). Thus, if congruent task choices 
were associated with a reduction of control that led to higher switch 
costs, then why were congruency effects not similarly elevated?
The answer to this question is far from obvious. However, factors 
influencing switch costs often fail to influence congruency effects. 
Several studies, for example, have reported that reducing the time 
between an explicit task cue and an imperative stimulus increases 
switch costs, but not congruency effects (Fagot, 1994; Rogers and 
Monsell, 1995; Monsell et al., 2003; Hübner et al., 2004; see Kiesel et al., 
2010 for a review). Shortening the duration of the cue-target interval 
is thought to reduce the time allowed by control process to prepare 
for an upcoming task switch (Meiran, 1996). Thus, these prior results 
also show that a reduction of top-down control can lead to increased 
switch costs in the absence of a change in the size of congruency effects.
One possible account of this dissociation is motivated by mod-
els that distinguish between two aspects of a task’s representation 
in working memory: (1) the task-level representation and (2) the 
parameter-level representation (Logan and Gordon, 2001; Rubinstein 
et al., 2001). The task-level representation is roughly equal to the goal 
or intention of performing a task. The parameter-level representation 
specifies the relevant stimuli, responses, and rules (e.g., S–R mappings) 
that underlie task performance. In one model (Rubinstein et al., 2001), 
the task-level representation is activated during cue-triggered task 
preparation while the parameter-level representation is activated only 
after the imperative stimulus is presented. Thus, a reduction of top-
down control during voluntary task choice might delay the formation 
of a task-level representation (i.e., the goal of performing a particular 
task), thereby biasing participants toward a congruent task choice and 
increased switch costs. However, it might not influence the param-
eter-level representation, which is activated only after an imperative 
stimulus appears. Therefore, congruency effects, which often index 
the activation of a currently irrelevant S–R mapping (MacLeod, 1991), 
might be unchanged. Future studies will clearly be needed to fully 
understand the dissociation between switch costs and congruency 
effects that we and others have observed. At present, we simply note 
that this dissociation is consistent with the existing literature.
Finally, we ruled out an alternative account of our finding that 
switch costs were higher after congruent task choices than after 
incongruent and neutral task choices. Specifically, we ruled out the 
possibility that the elevated switch costs in congruent task choice 
trials reflected greater proactive interference from the previous 
trial. Proactive interference is more pronounced when the interval 
between successive imperative stimuli is relatively short than when it 
is relatively long (Allport et al., 1994). Thus, relatively high levels of 
such interference could have contributed to the relatively high switch 
costs in congruent task choice trials if congruent task choices were 
made more quickly than incongruent task choices (thereby shorten-
ing the interval between successive imperative stimuli). Weighing 
against this possibility, mean task choice RT did not differ for con-
gruent, incongruent, and neutral task choices. Thus, there is no evi-
dence to suggest that heightened proactive interference contributed 
to the relatively high switch costs in congruent task choice trials.
only indirectly through response–decision priming. In that case, 
the congruent task choice bias should vanish when the distracter 
letters are associated with the decision to perform a task, but not 
with the response used to indicate that decision.
Given that participants did not always make congruent task 
choices, one might wonder why the congruent task choice bias was 
present in some trials but not others. An intriguing possibility is 
that top-down control varied over the course of the experiment 
due to such factors as fatigue (De Jong, 2000), diminished moti-
vation (Gray, 2001), or a bias to avoid expending cognitive effort 
(Botvinick, 2007; Kool et al., 2010). Such temporary reductions of 
control may have reduced the efficiency of the top-down random 
task sequence heuristic, thereby allowing the bottom-up availability 
heuristic to more strongly influence task choice (Demanet et al., 
2010). Future studies could test this hypothesis by manipulating 
various factors (e.g., fatigue) that are thought to affect the recruit-
ment of top-down control.
We have argued that the congruent task choice bias reflects a 
bottom-up influence on voluntary task choice. A typical signature 
of such influences, however, is that they dissipate with time. For 
example, the task-repetition bias is usually weaker when the inter-
val between trials is relatively long than when it is relatively short 
(Arrington and Logan, 2004, 2005; Demanet et al., 2010), likely 
because top-down processes have more time to select a task (and 
override the availability heuristic) before the next voluntary cue 
appears (Arrington and Logan, 2005; Arrington, 2008). Given such 
considerations, one might have expected weaker task-repetition 
and congruent task choice biases at the long RCI than at the short 
RCI. However, neither of these biases varied with the duration of 
the RCI. Our claim that the congruent task choice bias reflects a 
bottom-up influence on voluntary task choice may therefore seem 
at odds with the rest of the voluntary task switching literature.
However, this discrepancy is likely accounted for by an impor-
tant difference between our paradigm and those typically used in 
voluntary task switching studies. In our paradigm, participants 
cannot predict whether a voluntary or an explicit task choice cue 
will appear in the next trial. In most other paradigms, however, par-
ticipants always know when a voluntary task choice will be required. 
Given the uncertainty in our paradigm, top-down processes may 
not be recruited to choose a task during the RCI because such 
recruitment would often constitute a waste of effort. For example, 
voluntarily choosing to perform the numerical size comparison 
task during the RCI would be a waste of effort if an explicit cue 
to perform the physical size comparison task appeared in the next 
trial. Critically, if top-down processes were not recruited to choose 
a task during the RCI, then the task primed by the distracter letters 
would influence task choice just as much when the RCI was long as 
when it was short, exactly as we observed. Thus, our finding that the 
congruent task choice bias was not reduced over time likely reflects 
the inclusion of a high percentage of explicit task choice trials in 
our paradigm, which was necessary to associate the distracter let-
ters in voluntary task choice trials with the representations they 
were meant to activate.
Our second finding was that switch costs in voluntary task choice 
trials were higher after congruent task choices than after incongru-
ent task choices. This result suggests that congruent task choices 
reflected reductions of top-down control that persisted to influence 
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In sum, the present results provide critical support for the view 
that bottom-up biases influence task choice in the voluntary task 
switching paradigm (Mayr and Bell, 2006; Demanet et al., 2010). 
Moreover, they show that succumbing to such biases predicts 
reduced top-down control during subsequent task performance. 
Given that our paradigm provides a relatively unambiguous meas-
ure of bottom-up biases on voluntary task choice, future studies 
might use it to more fully characterize (a) which representations 
contribute to such biases and (b) why such biases exert a stronger 
influence on task choice in some trials than in others.
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